The Strategic Risks of Foreign-Made Cranes in America’s Ports

America’s maritime infrastructure plays a vital role in facilitating economic stability and national defense. U.S. ports support the transport of consumer goods and enable rapid deployment of military assets. However, much of this capability, and its infrastructure, relies on cranes that transfer containers and cargo at ports of entry, creating vulnerabilities with significant impacts for commerce, logistical military support, and the global economy if operations are disrupted.

Furthering this issue, these cranes are increasingly sourced from foreign enterprises, some of which are state-owned. While generally cost-effective and technologically advanced, these systems are more than just mechanical equipment; they are complex, software-based platforms that rely on network connectivity, remote diagnostics, and proprietary code to function. Reliance on foreign-manufactured and remotely-supported systems introduces cybersecurity and operational vulnerabilities that extend beyond basic maintenance considerations. From potential commercial supply chain disruptions to serious national security threats stemming from covert surveillance, the risks associated with this equipment warrant urgent, thorough scrutiny and implementation of risk mitigation tactics.

Cybersecurity and National Security Threats

In the event of political, economic, or military disputes, a crane manufacturer, or state actor on their behalf, could conceivably restrict or manipulate exports of critical components and materials essential to U.S. maritime infrastructure, or even cease maintenance support entirely. For ports reliant on proprietary technology and foreign-sourced components, such a disruption could invite prolonged outages, crippling the flow of goods and commodities to businesses and consumers. Alarmingly, many cranes can be remotely accessed and patched by technicians overseas. While such functionality is convenient and efficient under quiet geopolitics, it creates a dangerous possibility for cyber attacks if cross-border relations sour. Threat actors could potentially exploit remote access to install malicious code, steal sensitive operational data, or disable equipment altogether.

Through a commercial lens, a sudden shutdown of cranes at major U.S. ports would result in unthinkable economic damage. Inhibiting the movement of goods and materials would destabilize economic trade partnerships and fuel ongoing trade tension. In such a scenario, retailers, manufacturers, and logistics providers would face severe inventory challenges. Late shipments and supply shortages could inflate pricing and delay production schedules, compromising faith in U.S. ports of entry. Global partners, seeing American ports as chokepoints vulnerable to disruption and manipulation, would almost certainly look for alternatives, even if the same foreign-owned cranes are used elsewhere throughout the world. The stakes are even higher in weighing national security concerns against these possibilities. The U.S. Department of Defense relies on commercial ports to deploy equipment and resources in times of crisis. If cranes at strategic or major ports were compromised, they could delay or derail military agility and mobilization, handicapping America’s ability to respond quickly and efficiently to conflict.

More surreptitiously than full-scale shutdowns, the software underpinning crane activity poses threats, too. Operating systems may include backdoors or hidden surveillance tools that can be used to gather valuable intelligence about U.S. maritime activity and other sensitive data. A software update meant to fix bugs could just as easily be used to introduce them. Absent thorough review, operational agreements might grant manufacturers access to source code and even allow inspections by foreign government officials. This opens the door to embedded spyware or exploited source code vulnerabilities that can be quietly activated at a time of maximum influence. As a result, critical U.S. infrastructure systems can function as a data-collection platform for a foreign adversary.

Surveillance can also occur through physical means, such as manufacturers installing hidden cameras and listening devices on the cranes without knowledge from U.S. ports or crane operators. This would allow threat actors to monitor ship activity, logistics, and defensive maneuvers and intercept private communications. In addition to the cyber and national security risks posed by covert surveillance, impacted organizations could also face significant privacy violations, as capturing sensitive information without consent could lead to regulatory issues and the loss of public trust.

Mitigation Tactics

Despite the scale and severity of the threat, there are actionable, tactical steps that port operators, logistics companies, and their executive leaders can take to reduce exposure and improve resilience. These steps are not only technical, they are also strategic, requiring coordination between IT, legal, operations, and government relations teams.

• Conduct Program Assessments – Begin with a full evaluation of crane systems and associated components, especially software and networking equipment. Identify foreign-sourced technology, assess known vulnerabilities, and determine where foreign manufacturers may retain access privileges.

• Establish Network Segmentation – Ensure that operational technology systems, including crane controllers, are isolated from business networks and the Internet. This helps reduce the number of access points an attacker could exploit and lowers the potential for cross-system compromise.

• Implement Continuous Monitoring – Use modern monitoring solutions that can flag unusual activity, such as unauthorized software updates, unexpected data flows, or communications with foreign IP addresses. Early detection is paramount to containment.

• Collaborate with Government Entities – Agencies like the Department of Transportation or the Department of Defense are already engaged in securing critical infrastructure. Establishing information-sharing partnerships can provide access to threat intelligence and best practices, positioning affected parties to coordinate and respond quicker in the event of a breach.

• Restrict Remote Access – While remote diagnostics and patching may offer efficiency, they also introduce persistent risk. Organizations should review and, where realistic and appropriate, renegotiate service agreements to limit or eliminate remote access, ideally bringing software support under direct U.S.-based control.

• Prepare for Regulatory Shifts – Given the rising concern at federal levels regarding the vulnerabilities posed by foreign-made cranes, greater regulation seems likely. Organizations should proactively prepare compliance strategies that allow for quick adaptation, whether swapping out hardware, revising contracts, or implementing new cybersecurity protocols.

The cranes anchoring America’s ports are far more than industrial equipment; they are digital gateways that come with clear, strategic risk. Their foreign origins and control mechanisms place them at the center of a potential crisis between cybersecurity, economic insurance, and national security. As business and government leaders have learned from supply chain disruptions, ransomware attacks, and geopolitical tension in recent years, it is far better to act early than react too late.

Securing the maritime infrastructure is both feasible and necessary. C-suite leadership can begin aligning financial, operational, and cybersecurity goals around a common objective: insulating America’s commercial lifelines and preserving national sovereignty in an era of complex, increasing global tension.

As digital infrastructure and physical systems become more enmeshed, understanding and mitigating strategic risks of foreign-made cranes must be a priority.